T errorists cannot threaten a modern state unless they neutralize its instruments of power, creating a vacuum that they can occupy. Doing so requires terror on the scale of civil war. Even sustained terror campaigns like those experienced by England, Northern Ireland, Russia, and Israel have not posed such threats. As was seen in the failure of strategic bombing during World War II and other conflicts, civilian populations can absorb great suffering before surrendering.
What terrorists can do is make life truly miserable. They can inflict direct damage to the people they injure, to the economies they disrupt, and to the leaders they discredit. They can inflict indirect damage by instilling fear over who will be next, by undermining investors' confidence in future economic activity, and by eroding faith in governments that cannot protect their people.
The direct effects of terrorism depend primarily on operational factors. How good are terrorists at recruitment, training, organization, execution, and fund-raising? How good are governments at deterring, disrupting, and punishing them? The indirect effects depend primarily on how effectively the parties communicate. How good are terrorists at spreading fear, anxiety, distrust, uncertainty, sadness, and recrimination? How good are governments at conveying assurance, confidence, and authority, despite any losses?
Communicating About the Risks of Terrorism
The political stakes riding on these communications are readily visible. After a halting initial response to the 9/11 attacks, the G. W. Bush administration tapped public fear and anger in ways that created strong general approval and enough support for specific policies to launch the Iraq War and pass the USA Patriot Act (see Huddy & Feldman, 2011, this issue) . In contrast, a clumsy response to the Madrid bombings undermined the Aznar government's chances in the ensuing national elections in Spain. The sustained courage communicated by Northern Ireland's peace parties eventually provided an outlet for the weary public there. The violence of the second Intifada dealt a severe blow to Israel's peace movement and Palestinian civil society.
Thus, strengthening or weakening public morale is a principal means to political ends. Terrorists hope to demonstrate a government's inability to defend its citizens and to provoke disproportionate responses that suggest a lack of competence and composure. If successful, terrorists can claim the moral superiority of their cause and weaken resistance to it (as happens when countries change their foreign policies, hoping to avoid becoming targets).
Public morale is, of course, an end in itself. In that light, terrorism is just another threat to a society's overall well-being, along with natural hazards, economic declines, and domestic strife. That broad perspective encouraged creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with an all-hazards portfolio-even if DHS gave short shrift to everything but terrorism before Hurricane Katrina Preparation of this manuscript was partially supported by Army Research Office Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative Grant W911NF-08-1-0301.
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Turning to public interface and public resilience, we think it is enormously important because it is naive to think that you will prevent all damage or you will prevent all of the incidents that one seeks to prevent. While we would certainly give prevention a very high priority, the fact is that if the overall strategic objective is to preserve the American way of life (that is, to ensure that no set of threats can fundamentally change the U.S. as we know it), then you need a very resilient public. We need a public that can react to a wide range of things that can happen, much of which we will never predict in advance, and to sustain that which we all believe in.
We give a very high importance to preparedness, realistic expectations and public understanding that lead to confidence. We will have some things to say about the responsibility to ensure that expectations are realistic. We will recommend that there be a major thrust to make DHS the "trusted source" for information in emergencies. That does not mean that all the expertise will come from DHS, but the public needs to know in an emergency that there's one communication channel that they can use to get the information and help they require. It needs to be a consistent source; it needs to be trustworthy. Welch went on to say, "In order to provide that [trusted information], S&T has a role to play in providing both physical and social science expertise because it is both a physical science and a social science issue" (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Advisory Committee, 2005, p. 3) .
To these ends, communication is central to all phases of any national strategy, from left of the "boom" to its right-in the language sometimes used to describe the time course of attempted attacks. Before an attack, sound communications can help officials to understand their publics' needs, can help those publics to prepare (as far as they can and wish to do so), and can help all parties to establish the social ties needed to weather a storm. During an attack, sound communications can help people to make the best out of a bad situation, minimizing not only their immediate losses but also anger over being denied vital information. After an attack, sound communications can help to restore lost trust, letting people recover as fast as the damage allows.
Such vital responses to threats and losses represent the kind of resilience sought by General Welch. Knowing that, terrorists have communication strategies with the opposite intent. Before an attack, they try to sow fear; during it, they hope to create confusion; afterward, they seek to spur dissension. If successful, they can advance their cause even when their operations fail (as with the finger-pointing after the Christmas Day bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253). Conversely, sound communications can strengthen a society by helping it to unite in the face of these challenges. As a result, governments worthy of trust must make communication central to their national strategy for dealing with terror. Of course, even the best words, delivered in the most effective ways, are no substitute for having the competencies addressed by other articles in this issue and for doing everything possible to reduce those risks.
The Sciences of Terrorist Risk Communication
As distinctive as terrorism may be, people face many other risks. Meeting their information needs has prompted extensive research into basic processes of risk perception and communication, with applications as diverse as nuclear power, pharmaceuticals, HIV/AIDS, natural disasters, breast cancer, breast implants, genetic testing, genetically modified crops, food contamination, and more (Breakwell, 2007; Casman & Fischhoff, 2008; Fischhoff, 2009; Löfst-edt & Boholm, 2008; Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002; Renn, 2008; Slovic, 2001 Slovic, , 2010 .
Because there are many risks, many experts, and many publics, there can be no single answer to the questions of how well experts communicate terror risks and how well the public understands them. The following sections illustrate how psychological science can be applied to describing, evaluating, and improving terror risk communications. Table 1 summarizes the unique demands and collaborations of risk communications aimed at helping people to master the facts needed to make effective decisions. The following sections illustrate them with examples involving two related classes of terrorist risks: nuclear explosions and radioactive dispersion devices (atom bombs and dirty bombs, respectively). Creating communications for other risks faces analogous challenges.
Analyzing Information Needs
Communications have no value unless they contain useful information. They have limited value if they have needed information but bury it in irrelevancies (like the consumer medication information sheets accompanying prescription Baruch Fischhoff drugs). Communications may even have negative value if their contents are so poorly selected and presented that recipients resent being denied better information or do not realize how much they are missing. Thus, the first step in communication is identifying the core set of critical facts, from the often-vast universe of potentially relevant facts, that matter most to recipients. Florig and Fischhoff (2007) demonstrated such analyses, identifying the information most relevant to communications before, during, and after a 10-kiloton terrorist nuclear explosion-one within the feasible range for a "homemade" device (i.e., not taken from a nuclear arsenal). Such a bomb would cause massive proximal damage, along with widespread contamination, whose radioactivity would diminish over time. As a result, prompt, effective sheltering (in a place that keeps radioactive particles from getting on the skin or in the lungs) can greatly reduce health effects should such an attack occur (Bouri, Norwood, & Sell, 2010) . Understanding these risks is essential to placing them in perspective among all the world's conceivable worries (Fischhoff & Morgan, 2009) .
Before. The DHS Emergency Supply List ( U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.) recommends permanently storing about two dozen items, including water, food, clothing, utensils, medicines, first aid supplies, personal sanitation supplies, a radio, flashlights, dust masks, and duct tape. An analysis based on 2006 retail prices estimated the cost of initially stocking these items at $465 and the annual restocking cost at $250, making for a 10-year cost of about $2,400 (assuming a 4% discount rate). From this perspective, the list might be useful to people who can afford its contents and who have secure storage areas. For others, it is irrelevant, perhaps even insulting, if interpreted as "You're on your own for selfprotection. We're sorry, if you can't afford it."
Whether people who have the wherewithal would want to stock up should depend on the expected benefit of having those items on hand at home. That depends on the probability of being close enough to a nuclear explosion to be threatened by fallout and close enough to the shelter to be saved by it. A simple calculation (see Table 2 in Florig & Fischhoff, 2007) put that probability at roughly 1.6 ϫ 10 Ϫ5 over 10 years (equal to the product of the probabilities of a nuclear attack occurring anywhere during the period, of that attack being near the shelter, of wind blowing fallout toward the shelter, of a timely alert being sounded, of that alert being heard, of an individual being close enough to the shelter to use it, of the individual deciding to use it, and of it proving adequate). For a four-person household, the calculation makes the cost per expected life saved, by having a shelter, about $15 million (calculated by dividing the cost by the probability of saving a life). This value is about three times higher than the norm for U.S. government investments in life-saving measures (Robinson, 2007) . Thus, if its only goal were protecting against a nuclear explosion, the list would be an ill-advised communication, because following its advice would deflect resources from more cost-effective ways to reduce risks. That conclusion might change if the analysis were broadened to consider other goals (e.g., protection from tornadoes or civil unrest) or if it used other estimates of costs and risks for the nuclear case. Without explicit analyses, though, there is no assurance that such advice is worth following. Widely accepted "best practices" can still be terrible if they've been unthinkingly copied from one source to the next.
During. Elaborate computer models have been created to predict the "fate and transport" of the radioactive materials that a nuclear explosion would disperse. A fully equipped emergency command center might have its choice among such models, updated with automatic feeds of meteorological data, and be just waiting to receive the "source term" giving the size, composition, and location of the radioactive material's release. These models' predictions might be helpful in plotting evacuation routes, after the fallout settles (see below). However, it would take an exceptional emergency system to absorb, analyze, and disseminate such information in the minutes following an attack. Table 2 shows results from an analysis identifying information that could be disseminated before an attack preparing people for its immediate aftermath. Recognizing that people cannot be expected to remember very much from warnings about so unlikely an event as a nuclear attack, the analysis offers simple advice keyed to a single parameter that people might reasonably estimate during an attack: their approximate distance from the explosion (column 2). The analysis makes a conservative assumption about wind speed (10 mph [16 kph]) in order to produce a rough estimate of the time until fallout arrives (column 1).
Comparing radiation risks with and without shelter (columns 3 and 4) leads to recommendations (column 5). As simple as these distinctions are, they may be enough to inform critical decisions such as whether there is time to collect a child from school or a vital prescription from a pharmacy. Tailored to local conditions, they suggest such simple summaries as, "A nuclear explosion in Pittsburgh is likely to be downtown. If you're in the city [roughly 10 miles across], seek shelter immediately. If you're in the county [roughly 50 miles across], you have up to an hour." Balancing analytical precision and cognitive capacity, that may be as good as advice can get.
After. People in shelters will want to know when they can leave. So will those waiting for them outside the intense contamination zone. Figure 1 shows an analytical answer to this question, based on a single consideration: whether people would absorb more radiation by staying or leaving. That depends on how well the shelter protects (its "dose reduction factor") and how long it would take a person to cross the contamination zone. As shown by the equal-radiation curves, the optimal sheltering time could be as short as 6 hours (if the shelter is poor and the person can get out of the zone quickly) or as long as 5 days (with a good shelter and long transit time).
In this analysis, the answer is the same whatever the radiation dose (with the simplifying assumption of equal radiation throughout the zone). As a result, there is no need to collect or communicate information about the degree of contamination. What residents do need is information about the transit time to safety and the protection that their shelters provide. For the former, they need estimates from officials who know how bad it is outside. For the latter, they need to know how to evaluate their shelter (e.g., what they can infer from its building materials, wall thickness, and ventilation). Of course, these decisions are not about radiation protection alone. People may want to evacuate sooner (or later) depending on how uncomfortable, lonely, or fearful they are. However, officials have an obligation to conduct and communicate the analyses that people need.
Disciplined by analysis. Each of these analyses takes an "inside view," in the sense of formally analyzing the decisions that individuals face (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) in order to determine what to tell them. Without that discipline, communications reflect no more than guesses about what people need to know. These three analyses were fairly simple. The first added costs and multiplied probabilities; the second divided distance by wind speed to get time; the third compared exposures inside and outside a shelter (each estimated by a more complex process). In these cases, expertise was needed primarily to identify the appropriate simple model and the best inputs for it. Fortunately (in this respect), the Cold War produced many studies of how radioactive materials disperse in the air, penetrate buildings and bodies, and wreak damage. These studies informed the simple calculations underlying Figure 1 . Some decisions require more complex analyses. For example, Dombroski, Fischhoff, and Fischbeck (2006) integrated models of particle dispersion, injury and radiation health effects, population location, and traffic patterns in order to predict the effects of a dirty bomb. Their casualty estimates were sensitive to some factors (e.g., the source term, detonation altitude) and insensitive to others. In particular, it did not matter that much what percentage of individuals near the explosion evacuated or sheltered in place as long as enough of them stayed off the road to allow emergency vehicles to rescue blast victims. Using a similar analytic approach, Casman, Fischhoff, Palmgren, Small, and Wu (2000) found that many systems for warning people about water contamination were useless without more rapid detection capabilities than they had for some contaminants (e.g., cryptosporidium). As a result, their warnings could contain no useful information. Useless communication systems not only waste the resources invested in them but leave the problem unaddressed.
Making Needed Information Useful
Once the critical information has been identified, it must be conveyed. Good practice here, too, begins with an inside view and involves asking what people currently believe so as to identify knowledge gaps that need closing and misconceptions that need fixing. It is easy enough to speculate about what needs to be said in the following three examples, before, during, and after a nuclear attack.
Before. DHS's Emergency Supply List contains everyday items needed to keep people going while they wait for things to improve. It should be immediately clear why most items are recommended. As with other checklists (Gawande, 2007) , people might be grateful to be reminded of things that had slipped their minds (e.g., pet food, cash, a whistle, prescriptions). The recommended amount of water (one gallon per person per day) might come as a surprise, influencing their behavior if it made sense, being brushed off if not. Other items might irritate or even anger those who find them impossible (e.g., "I don't have a spare $500, even if I
Figure 1 Equal-Radiation Curves Showing the Conditions Under Which People in Shelters Would Absorb the Same Radiation by Staying and Leaving
Note. Exposure to radiation is shown as a function of the shelter's dose-reduction factor (x-axis) and the time (in hours, or h) needed to traverse the falloutcontaminated zone during evacuation (y-axis). For example, after 6 hours, people would face the same radiation risk from staying as from leaving if their shelter has a dose-protection factor of 0.4 and they can cross the contaminated zone in 3.5 hours. Other things being equal, most would leave then. They should wait another 6 hours (12 hours overall) if it would take them 6 hours to cross the zone. With very protective shelters and long transit times, it might take several days (d) until there is less risk from going than from staying. Reprinted from "Individuals' Decisions Affecting Radiation Exposure After a Nuclear Event" by H. K. Florig and B. Fischhoff, 2007, Health Physics, 92, p. know that ATMs might be down after a nuclear attack." "Mice would get to the pet food in my shelter; thieves would get to the hidden cash; my meds need refrigeration.") Readers' intuitive probability of ever using a shelter and its contents might be higher or lower than DHS's implicit probability, depending on their imagination, powers of denial, and trust in government, among other things.
During. Some parts of the rationale for Table 2 's recommendations about what to do after a nuclear explosion should be easy to explain: "Winds carry dangerous radioactive fallout. The further you are from the blast, the more time you have to improve your position (find shelter, collect loved ones, gather supplies, flee the area)." Other parts, though, might be less intuitive, such as what factors determine risk levels. Here, some elementary health physics might fill the gaps ("Radioactive particles are most dangerous when they get on your body or in your lungs.") in ways that allow people to make their own inferences ("I had better get inside, close the windows, and wash off"). Pursuing this strategy, with some of the same facts, clarified the value of radon testing ("If your house has a radon problem, it can be fixed by stopping gas intrusions from the subsoil under it. Radon's byproducts decay quickly. As a result, once the intrusions stop, so does the problem, leaving no lasting contamination.") (Bostrom, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 1992; Environmental Protection Agency, 1986) .
After. The same physical principles explain the recommendations following from Figure 1 , "A shelter can keep some, but not all, radioactive particles from getting on your skin and into your lungs. At some point, the radiation outside will settle and decay enough for the short, intense exposure during evacuation to be less risky than staying where you are. We'll tell you when that time comes, based on what we know about where the radiation went." Officials could add, "We're starting the evacuations with the least protective homes, based on real estate records." People without working radios or phones would have to guess when to leave their shelter. The information in Figure 2 might help them to assess and even improve their situation ("Only basements and internal rooms provide any real protection. Concrete is good.") Kinds of communication. Atlhough focused on a nuclear attack, these three examples show the kinds of information typical to risk communications. There are quantitative estimates, showing the sizes of risks and the effectiveness of solutions (how much damage radiation can do, how much protection shelters provide). There are scientific principles, partly explaining the estimates (how radioactive particles travel, how they cause damage, how buildings protect). There are epistemological concerns, determining the strength of the analyses (how well a source term is known, how predictable evacuations are). There are also neglected factors (e.g., nonradiation reasons for leaving a shelter), indirect effects ("Evacuating people with the least protective housing first also means giving highest priority to the poorest people in our community."), and background information ("We have specially trained emergency teams in all nursing homes, so your loved ones will get good care, even if you can't reach them.") Which kinds of information need to be communicated depends on what people know already, an empirical question whose answer requires studying the target audience.
Whatever their content, communications must adopt a rhetorical stance that is either persuasive, trying to induce some behavior (e.g., stock up, take shelter), or nonpersuasive, trying to facilitate informed decision making (e.g., about how best to use the time until fallout arrives). Persuasion is appropriate when people want clear instructions, so that they need not master the facts (e.g., when time is short). Nonpersuasive communication is appropriate when people want knowledge, autonomy, and feelings of selfefficacy. People may naturally suspect the content of persuasive communications, wondering which facts have been spun, or may object to the idea of someone manipulating them "for their own good" (Fischhoff, 2007; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009 ). They may, conversely, resent nonpersuasive communications that leave them responsible for choices that they do not fully understand or don't want to think about. Here, too, getting the communications right requires studying recipients' desires and needs.
Testing for Success
Because they reflect basic psychological research and some dedicated studies (e.g., Bostrom et al., 1992) , these speculations about the three nuclear explosion communications might be better than ones made without that knowledge. However, they are still speculations. Other speculations led the National Academies (2004) to feature basic information on physical processes when communicating on these topics. Its messages assumed that people will understand specific facts better if they first learn general ones, such as "When radioactive elements decay, they produce energetic emissions (alpha particles, beta particles or gamma rays) that can cause chemical changes in tissues. The average person in the United States receives a 'background' dose of about one-third of a rem." (A footnote gives the equivalence 1 Sievert ϭ 100 rem.) Such physics facts might lead people to complete widely useful mental models or discourage them from reading further. How well any communication succeeds is an empirical question to be answered by evaluation studies.
Although empirical evaluation is straightforward (Fischhoff, 2009), there is surprisingly little research on the success of terror risk communications in conveying information essential to specific decisions (as opposed to conveying general information that it might be nice to know). Remarkably, the United States has no national tracking survey following the public's beliefs about the nature of terror risks, the effectiveness of response measures, the perceived degree of social support, the trustworthiness of various officials, and so on. In effect, the country has chosen to fly blind on these vital issues.
Three examples from isolated studies may suggest what systematic research would reveal. Table 3 shows responses of a representative sample of Americans surveyed late in 2002, a year after the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, amidst the smallpox vaccination campaign, the run-up to the Iraq War, and the outbreak of West Nile virus. Despite saturation media coverage and intense government efforts, several easily understood, essential facts had not been conveyed. Respondents had not learned that anthrax is not contagious, that West Nile is rarely fatal to people, that smallpox vaccine can be given after exposure, or that sheltering in place can be the best response to a dirty bomb. Respondents believed people will panic in such an attack, despite also believing that "ordinary citizens [had] behaved responsibly during the 2001 attacks." The unfounded expectation of panic is common among officials as well (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; Tierney, 2003; Wessely, 2005) . Figure 3 shows judgments of another widely publicized risk (albeit one unlikely to be used by terrorists): the probability of the avian flu virus (H5N1) becoming transmissible among humans in the three years following the survey (conducted in October 2005). The experts were leading public health figures; the "experts" were leaders in other fields, mostly communication technologies that might help keep society running during a pandemic. The medical experts were divided. Most saw a low probability (around 10%), whereas a minority saw a high one (around 70%). The nonmedical "experts" mostly saw high probabilities, based on the torrent of media coverage at the time, which included lots of information but no numeric probabilities. Over the ensuing three years, the virus neither went away nor progressed far toward pandemic status. As a result, the medical experts' generally low probabilities seem fairly reasonable. However, the much higher probabilities that the nonmedical "experts" perceived make it seem as though the medical community had been alarmist. Thus, the public was told a lot, but not what it needed to know: the probability of a pandemic.
With unique threats, such as an avian flu pandemic or weapons of mass destruction, risks must be estimated analytically. Unless experts share their estimates, nonexperts must infer them from whatever the experts do reveal (Brandon, 2011, this issue; Kaptan & Fischhoff, 2010; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011, this issue) . With repeated events, individuals can produce their own estimates, based on the frequency of observed events (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) . In some periods, terrorist attacks are frequent enough to allow such judgments. Figure 4 shows judgments made at the website of a major travel magazine for "the probability of being injured in a terrorist attack" during visits to three destinations (of eight in the study). At the time (late 2002), the Bali bombings had just occurred and the second Intifada was at what proved to be its peak. For Israel, the median estimate was roughly 10 times the rate for the preceding two years but still within the range of defensible values. For the other destinations, respondents' probability judgments also had plausible values, in addition to being sensibly correlated with other responses, such as their reported concern about terror risk factors (e.g., sticking out as an American) and nonterror travel risks (e.g., contracting an infectious disease), their travel risk thresholds (before cancelling a trip), and their general risk attitudes. Thus, despite receiving no organized communication about these terror risks, these travelers made seemingly reasonable risk judgments, consistent with their other beliefs, preferences, and feelings (Fischhoff, Bruine de Bruin, Perrin, & Downs, 2004) .
From Speculation to Investigation
Online surveys with self-selected samples (as in the travel risk study) are an imperfect form of evidence however involved respondents might be. So are surveys of experts invited to a meeting, even though systematically elicited expert judgments provide critical inputs to many risk assessments (Fischhoff, Atran, & Fischhoff, 2007; Fischhoff, Bruine de Bruin, Güvenc, Caruso, & Brilliant, 2006; Fischhoff & Chauvin, 2011; Morgan & Henrion, 1990; Morgan & Keith, 1995; O'Hagan et al., 2006) . However, without sustained data collection, all we have is fragmentary evidence regarding judgments of terror risks and responses to communications. The judgments reported in Table 2 are from one of the few studies to revisit the same sample (see also Shambaugh et al., 2010) . Comparisons found steep declines in judged terror risks from late 2001 to late 2002, appropriately correlated with individual respondents' experiences and observations (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005; . The comparisons also revealed strong hindsight bias, such that respondents could not remember how great the risks had appeared a year earlier.
Without evidence, communicators must rely on intuition to select and convey the content of their communications. Figure 5 shows a representative result of such reliance. It shows two screen shots from www.ready.gov,
Figure 3 Judgments of the Probability of the Avian Flu Virus (H5N1) Becoming Transmissible Among Humans in the Three Years Following an October 2005 Survey
Note. The figure shows judgments by medical experts (dark bars) and nonmedical "experts" (gray bars) of "the probability that H5N1 will become an efficient human-to-human transmitter (capable of being propagated through at least two epidemiological generations of humans) sometime during the next 3 years." Median judgments: medical experts, 15%; nonmedical "experts," 60%.
Reprinted from "Expert Judgments of Pandemic Influenza Risks" by W. Bruine de Bruin, B. Fischhoff, L. Brilliant, and D. Caruso, 2006, Global Public Health, 1, p. 184 maintained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The top portion of the figure has guidance on responding to a nuclear explosion, with each panel having seemingly obvious flaws. Panel 1assumes the existence of fall-out shelters and signs, despite their being neglected since the end of the Cold War. Panel 2 implies that people can outrun a blast. Panel 3 uses wording ("consider," "would it be better") that shifts decision-making responsibility to laypeople likely to want authoritative guidance. The bottom portion of the figure (from another screen) throws the top one (and everything else at the site) into question. It is not hard to imagine the bureaucratic processes that led to this disclaimer-and their indifference to users' concerns. Despite these flaws, these communications might, conceivably, still have conveyed useful information and built trust in the competence and caring of the officials who created them. Without empirical evaluation, there is no way of knowing. Psychological research suggests several natural human tendencies that might explain why officials might rely on intuition, rather than research, even when research is inexpensive relative to the stakes riding on successful communication. One such tendency is exaggerating how well one communicates, thus making evaluation unnecessary. A second is unwittingly lacking empathy for others' circumstances and information needs (e.g., Epley, Keysar, VanBoven, & Gilovich, 2004; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Nickerson, 1999) . A third is misreading historical events, not realizing, say, that the communication strategies (and communicators) that seemed so effective right after 9/11 also produced the miscommunications around the anthrax attacks and the World Trade Center clean-up (Thomas, 2003) . A fourth is underestimating the public's ability to learn and make decisions, a tendency seen in the myth of panic and popular accounts of human frailty. Why try too hard if it seems that the public cannot handle or even understand the truth?
In order to overcome these natural barriers to effective communication, organizations need staff that can reveal and address their blindspots (see Table 1 ). They need psychologists who can study their audience's needs, design potentially effective communications, and evaluate their usefulness. They need subject-matter experts who can ensure the accuracy of their messages. They need risk and decision analysts who can identify the few most critical facts from the "firehoses" that subject matter experts can open on them. They need communication specialists who can create the channels for staying in touch with their publics (National Research Council, 1989 , 1996 , 2008 . They need leaders who can coordinate these diverse professionals, keeping them focused on their own areas of expertise. Those leaders must, for example, keep psychologists from distorting the facts of radiation physics when hoping to simplify them and keep physicists from drowning their audience in irrelevant facts when hoping to seize a teachable moment.
That leadership must also decide when to treat communication as a public health activity, designed to help its audiences, and when to treat it as a public affairs activity, designed to advance their own interests. Over time, organizations may need both kinds of communication, ones serving the public and themselves. At any one time, though, the two strategies are incompatible. Public health communications must address problems that politicians might prefer to hide. Public affairs communications naturally add spin, advancing favored facts and frames.
Psychology can support either strategy. Its research has long been a pillar of marketing and public relations. Recently, public health agencies have increasingly seen its value. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2002) has incorporated psychologists and other social scientists in its emergency command post. The Canadian Standards Association's (1997/2002) risk management framework affords communication a central role, requiring psychological expertise to conduct surveys, design consultations, and evaluate performance (see Figure 6 ). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2009) has adopted a Strategic Plan for Risk Communication, with an agency-wide
Figure 6
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Recommended Procedure for Managing Risks
Note. The middle of the figure shows a fairly standard sequential process of a risk management project, distinguished mainly by the four-way arrows between stages, requiring a kind of reality check whereby a process may not be completed unless satisfactory. The dark bar on the left shows a distinctive commitment to public involvement at all stages of the process, from Initiation to Action/Monitoring, with two-way arrows indicating that the public should both be heard and receive necessary information. Reprinted from "The Science and Practice of Risk Ranking" by B. Fischhoff and G. Morgan, 2009, Horizons, 10, p. action plan that includes regular consultation with its statutory Risk Communication Advisory Committee.
Psychologists have limited ability to open these doors by themselves. Typically, organizations must be hurting badly enough from perceived miscommunication to look for help. Whether they look to psychological science will partly depend on their current staffing. Without some psychologists on staff, they may not seek scientific help or know where to find it, perhaps turning instead to consultants who promise to do the impossible (e.g., make the public love an organization however competent its performance). What psychologists can do is be ready when opportunities do arise. That means familiarizing themselves with the issues and institutions in a domain and getting to know some of the people in it. It means treating openings as opportunities to serve, not as chances to promote pet theories or methods. It means relishing the challenges of collaborating with people from unfamiliar disciplines (physicists, physicians, politicians) and of representing unfamiliar areas of their own discipline when they are the only psychologists on the scene. The rewards for these ventures may include meeting some unusual people, identifying some new phenomena worthy of basic research, and repaying some of our collective debt to the society that has supported us.
